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PROTECTED EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY UNDER SECTION 7
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1973)
Smith and three co-workers had negotiated for a new employment
contract with respondent trucking company. Although the co-workers
agreed to new terms, Smith continued to express his dissatisfaction with
the new contract. The company discharged him, claiming that his per-
sistent complaining was causing dissension among his co-workers. The
National Labor Relations Board ordered respondent to reinstate Smith,1
finding that the company had violated section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act,2 which prohibits the discharge of an employee
for engaging in activities protected by section 7 of the Act.3 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the order4 and
1. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (June 12, 1972).
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as NLRA] provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title.
3. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist la-
bor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...
4. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973). The
court characterized its decision as resting on the law and not the facts of the case.
Id. at 719. The United States Supreme Court presented the standard for court review
of NLRB orders in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). A review-
ing court can set aside a Board decision
when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision
is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety fur-
nishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.
Id. at 488. Prior to Universal Camera, the Fifth Circuit had taken the position that
since employee reinstatement is a harsh remedy, there is a presumption that employer
testimony is true, and employee claims must "substantially contradict" the testimony.
NLRB v. Tex-O-Can Flour Mills Co., 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1941). The Supreme
Court has admonished the Fifth Circuit for applying a more stringent test than the one
laid down by Universal Camera. NLRB v. Watson Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962).
Thus the court in Buddies was careful to reverse the Board order on the law rather
than the facts of the case. For a discussion of Watson, see 62 COLuM. L. Rlv. 1330
(1962). For a general overview of the Fifth Circuit's decisions in labor cases for the
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held: Smith's complaints constituted mere individual action and hence
were not protected by the Act.5
Until the relevant common law was modified by an act of Parliament
in 1875,6 the English courts consistently held that any employee at-
tempt to organize the labor force constituted an unlawful combination.7
American courts initially adhered to the common law's total prohibition
against employee combinations but public pressures eventually forced
period 1966-1972, see Comment, Labor Law in the Fifth Circuit: A Survey of Selected
Areas, 9 HousToN L. REv. 717 (1972).
5. The decision also reversed a second Board order. The Board had found that
respondent had violated § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), which
prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage
or discourage" union membership. The respondent contended that it had no knowledge
of union activity, and that the discharge was made because of the employee's dishon-
esty. The court held that knowledge of union activity could not be imputed to the
respondent, and thus the discharge was not discriminatory. For a discussion of the
requirement of employer knowledge in § 8(a) (3) violations, see Christensen & Svanoe,
Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court
and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.. 1269 (1968); 48 B.U.L. Rnv. 142 (1968).
6. Conspiracy and Protection Act of 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 86. See note 7 infra.
7. The criminality resulted from the mere combination, and it did not matter if
the end was lawful:
[A] conspiracy of any kind is illegal, although the matter about which they
conspired might have been lawful for them, or any of them, to do, if they had
not conspired to do it ....
The King v. Joumeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, 88 Eng. Rep. 9, 10 (K.B. 1721).
"[E]ach may insist on raising his wages, if he can; but if several meet for the same
purpose, it is illegal .. . ." The King v. Mawbey, 101 Eng. Rep. 736, 745 (K.B.
1796). See also The King v. Eccles, 99 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B. 1783); The King v.
Sterling, 83 Eng. Rep. 331 (K.B. 1665). For an outline of conspiracy cases in the
English courts, see J. LANDIS & M. MANOFF, CASES ON LABOR LAw 1-40 (2d ed. 1942).
The rise of trade unionism as a political force in England probably triggered the
passage of the Conspiracy and Protection Act, which provided that a combination by
two or more persons to do an act which was legal for one to do was not unlawful.
The fall of Gladstone, a constant foe of legislation ameliorating the conspiracy rule,
and the first election of labor members to the House of Commons in 1874, certainly
added to the pressure for new legislation. For a thorough analysis of trade unionism
in England, see B. WEBB & S. WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (rev. ed.
1920).
8. The American courts upheld the doctrine throughout the 18th century and into
the 19th century. The first important case to adopt the theory was the Case of the
Philadelphia Cordwainers (Commonwealth v. Pullis) (Mayor's Ct. Phila. 1806), re-
ported in 3 J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, DocumErARY HISTORY OF AMERIcAN INDus-
TRIAL SocmTy 59-248 (1910). See also People v. Fischer, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1835);
People v. Trequier, 1 Wheel. Crim. Cas. 142 (N.Y. 1823); People v. Melvin, 2 Wheel.
Crim. Cas. 262 (N.Y. 1810). For a brief survey of these early cases, see J. LANDIS
& M. MANOFF, supra note 7; Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825
(1926).
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a relaxation of the restriction.9 Finally, Congress encouraged and pro-
tected labor organizing by passing the National Labor Relations Act
in 1935.10 Section 7 of the Act protects "concerted activities" by
employees 1 and section 8(a)(1)1 2 impliedly prevents an employer
from discharging an employee who engages in those activities.
It is unclear what specific concerted activities are protected by the
broad language of section 7. In the absence of any legislative history
on this issue, 13 the courts have developed certain standards to be used
9. The steady growth of unionism in American society generated increasing public
pressure for revision of the common law. Finally, in 1842, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, faced with a potential riot, set aside the criminal conviction of seven
members of the Boston Journeymen Bootmakers' Society. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45
Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842). After the Hunt decision, few courts applied the conspir-
acy theory. One of the last reported cases invoking the conspiracy rule was State v.
Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151 (Sup. Ct. 1867). For a brief summary of the American con-
spiracy rule, see A. Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAW 8-21 (4th ed. 1958); 1. WLAMS, LA-
BOR RE.ATIONS AND THE LAW 18-23 (3d ed. 1965).
10. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970). The
first legislation that spoke to the problem of employee organization was the Clayton
Act of 1914, which provided: "[N]o ... injunction shall prohibit any person or per-
sons, whether singly or in concert, from ... ceasing to perform any work or labor
.... Ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970). The Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932, which affirmed the right of labor to organize, provided:
[Ilt is necessary that [the individual unorganized worker] shall be free from
the interference, restraint or coercion of employers ... in self-organization or
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection ....
Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
The NLRA was passed in 1935, and, in pertinent part, contained virtually the same
provisions as are found in current 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1970). In passing the Act,
Congress moved from recognition of the right to organize to a policy of protecting and
encouraging unionism. See generally C. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY (1948); C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW (rev. ed. 1958); H. MILLIS & E.
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFr-HARTLEY (1950); Note, The Requirement of
"Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 514 (1953).
II. See note 3 supra.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. The legislative history is contained in S. REP. No. 114, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933); HR. REP. No. 159, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). See also 79
CONG. REc. 7653-75 (1935) (Senate debates); id. at 9687-731 (House debates). The
overriding policy of the Act is set out in § 1:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
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in ascertaining when the discharge of an employee violates section 8(a)
(1). At the very least, it is clear that a discharge is not wrongful
unless made with knowledge of the employee's activity.'4 Nor does
the Act protect "unlawful" concerted activities'5 or protests unrelated
to employment conditions.' 6 Most activities involving a significant mi-
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The Supreme Court has stated that the Act was passed primar-
ily to recognize a fundamental right to organize. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1936). For a full interpretation of the legislative history, see H. MiLLIS &
E. BROWN, supra note 10.
14. Since the employer must consciously interfere with protected rights in order
to violate § 8(a) (1), he must know of the activities and discharge the employee be-
cause of them. See Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 179 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1949). See generally 66 HARv. L. REV. 1534
(1953); 62 YALE L.J. 1263 (1953).
This scienter requirement is even clearer in cases of a § 8(a) (3) discriminatory dis-
charge because of union activities. The word "discrimination" implies a choice be-
tween alternative courses made with full knowledge of the facts. See NLRB v. Schill
Steel Prods., Inc., 340 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204
F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1953). See generally Gorske, Burden of Proof in Grievance Ar-
bitration, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 135, 149-58 (1959); articles cited note 5 supra.
15. There is some uncertainty as to what constitutes an "unlawful" protest. Gener-
ally, the courts will not consider a protest in contravention of state or federal law to be a
protected activity under § 7. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942)
(strike in violation of federal meeting statute); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 (1939) (strike in violation of local laws prohibiting violence or seizure
of property). Some courts consider activity in violation of the employment contract
and activity unfairly harmful to the employer as unprotected activities. See Local
1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346
U.S. 464 (1953) (handbill derogating product held unfairly damaging to employer);
Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951) (employees remaining at work
cannot request consumer boycott); NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 166 F.2d 485 (6th Cir.
1948) (solicitation during work hours unprotected if against company rules); NLRB
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946) (partial work stoppage un-
protected if breach of employment contract).
16. The courts have asserted that the purpose of the NLRA was to equalize the
bargaining position of the laborer vis-a-vis his employer in the context of the employ-
ment contract. See NLRB v. Bretz Fuel Co., 210 F.2d 392 (4th Cir. 1954) (activities
to influence legislation not protected); NLRB v. Jamestown Veneer & Plywood Corp.,
194 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1952) (walkout to protest short notice of layoff not for the
purpose of improving conditions); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th
Cir. 1949) (attempt to discharge foreman made for personal reasons); NLRB v. Rey-
nolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947) (walkout to protest demotion of fore-
man was in his interest, not employees'). See generally Cox, The Right to Engage
in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L. 319 (1950); 44 ILL. L. REv. 234 (1949). For a
general discussion of "unlawful" concerted action, see Note, Unprotected Activity Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 3 UTAH L. REv. 358 (1953); 66 HAIv. L. REv.
1321 (1953); 4 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 377 (1953).
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nority of employees, however, whether non-union or union, generally
are within the scope of section 7. Thus, an employer may not dis-
charge employees because of a group walkout protesting the conditions
of the work area or treatment of a co-employee,1 7 union activity in the
form of organization attempts and petitions,' or employee action in
support of fellow unions. 19
While the decisions have been relatively consistent in ascertaining
whether employee discharge for union or other cohesive group activity
violates section 8(a)(1), inconsistency has arisen in applying the Act
to actions by individual employees. The Third Circuit has held that
section 7 does not protect conduct by one employee unless it is for
the purpose of inducing group action.2 Thus, although the employee
need not be a formally chosen spokesman, he is protected from discharge
17. Since any employer action jeopardizing the rights of a particular employee
affects the general employer-employee relationship, courts have usually held that group
protest of one employee's treatment is protected. See NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966); Modern Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d
925 (8th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. J.I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 917 (1953); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944).
18. See Texas Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1970); A.J. Krajew-
ski Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Mid State Sportswear,
Inc., 412 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transport Clearings, Inc., 311 F.2d 519
(5th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Quality Art Novelty Co., 127 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1942). For
a casebook evolution of this topic, see A. Cox, supra note 9, at 282-333. A general
discussion and list of cases is contained in Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 352 (1951).
19. The case most often cited as support for this proposition is NLRB v. Peter
Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942). Judge Learned Hand,
writing for the court, reasoned that any union is interested in the success of its fellow
unions since that success strengthens the labor movement in general. See Signal Oil
& Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Louisville Chair Co., 385
F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); NLRB v. City Yellow
Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965). For a general discussion of this area, see Cox,
supra note 16; Note, supra note 10.
20. In Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964), the
court stated:
It follows that, if we were to hold that Keeler's conversations constituted con-
certed activity, it could only be upon the basis that any conversation between
employees comes within the ambit of activities protected by the Act provided
it relates to the interests of the employees. We are unable to adopt this view.
Accord, Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 935 (1970) (employees acted independently and individually in protest over
profit-sharing plan); Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967)
(cartoon deriding wage increase unprotected personal protest); NLRB v. Office Towel
Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953), noted in 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 111 (1953)
and 66 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1953) (mere griping too inchoate for protection). See
generally Note, Concerted Activity Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 129.
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only if the object of his speech is to form a united group for the presen-
tation of a grievance.21
In contrast to the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit has adopted a
"collective rights" approach to actions by individuals under section 7.
Pursuant to this approach, a personal grievance by an employee is pro-
tected as long as the right he enforces is common to all other employ-
ees.
22
In Buddies the Fifth Circuit adopted the Third Circuit's reasoning.
The court concluded that since the other employees were satisfied with
the new contracts, Smith's persistent complaints were individual and
thus unprotected by section 7.23 The court explicitly rejected the Sec-
ond Circuit's "collective rights" formulation on two grounds. First,
it distinguished the cases underlying that formulation 24 by noting that
each involved a collective bargaining agreement; hence the court limited
21. See Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1349 (3d Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., 285 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1960).
The NLRB in Buddies evidently rested its decision to some extent on this factor.
While Smith was not a formally chosen spokesman, there was testimony to indicate
that his co-workers "expected" him to bring up the matter of the new contract with the
respondent. Brief for Petitioner at 21, NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1973).
22. The main decision setting forth the Second Circuit's view is NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). In NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co.,
398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969), the court
clarified its position by holding that an attempt by employees to enforce their under-
standing of a collective bargaining agreement is a protected activity if the employees
have a reasonable basis for believing that their understanding of the terms was the
understanding that had been agreed upon.
The most complete discussion of the collective rights approach is contained in Illi-
nois Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 281-90 (8th Cir. 1968) (Lay,
J., dissenting). Judge Lay's main argument is that Congress passed the NLRA to pro-
tect the employee in his relationship with the employer. Any act that materially af-
fects that relationship, regardless of intent, should be protected. That does not mean,
however, that § 7 protects individual protest which is vented by reason of personal
animosity or is unrelated to group interest or concern. The Eighth Circuit subsequently
adopted this position. NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Co., 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970).
Recently, the Seventh Circuit approved the Interboro language and held that one em-
ployee acting alone was protected in his effort to enforce a previous promise of a wage
increase. NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971).
23. The court ignored Smith's earlier acts of leadership when the drivers were all
unsigned. The NLRB considered this activity as the primary reason for his discharge,
noting the close temporal relation between his efforts to unite the drivers and his dis-
charge. Brief for Petitioner at 22, NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1973). By concentrating on Smith's activity after the drivers had
signed, the court found it easier to characterize the activities as purely personal.
24. See nQte 22 supra,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/10
Vol. 1973:931] PROTECTED EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY
the application of the "collective rights" approach to contracts secured
by collective bargaining.25 Secondly, the court construed section 7 to
protect conduct by an employee only if intended to induce collective
activity, and not individual action designed solely for the benefit of
other employees. -6
Although the National Labor Relations Act protects the right of em-
ployees to organize, it leaves the non-union employee particularly vul-
nerable to discharge. 7  At least three circuits protect an individual em-
ployee with a collective bargaining agreement in his efforts to negotiate
a grievance.28 The non-union employee who fails to generate a united
group, however, risks discharge because his continued complaining rep-
resents "individual" action unprotected by the National Labor Relations
Act. It is difficult to justify the individual/group activity distinction
when one considers the goal of the Act-to allow the employee to nego-
25. While Interboro, Langenbacher, and Selwyn concern protests over collective
bargaining agreements, there is nothing in these opinions to suggest that the "collective
rights" approach is limited to cases involving such agreements. The Second Circuit
view seems to treat collective bargaining agreements as a source of rights common
to all. Thus, when an employee protests to secure a right under a collective bargaining
agreement, he automatically affects the rights of his co-employees.
In the principal case, if Smith had succeeded in his negotiations, there would have
been a resulting benefit for the other drivers. This case seems most similar in its facts
to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pekin. See note 22 supra. There, the court noted
the absence of a written collective bargaining agreement, but stressed that there was
a "relationship" between the employees as a group and the employer, and an oral agree-
ment to negotiate for new contracts. 452 F.2d at 206.
26. The court's statutory construction argument is taken from the Third Circuit's
rejection of the "collective rights" approach in NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d
881 (3d Cir. 1971). That court reasoned that only group activity is protected, and,
therefore, an individual is protected only when he intends to generate group activity.
Judge Biggs' dissent, quoting from the Second Circuit's opinion in Interboro, reasoned
that the individual who asserts a right held by all employees is, in effect, representing
that group. Therefore, Judge Biggs concluded, the collective nature of the right as-
serted fulfills the statutory requirement of concerted activity. Id. at 888 (Biggs, J.,
dissenting).
27. The Fifth Circuit in its first discussion of § 7 stated:
Contrary to a rather general misconception, the National Labor Relations
Act was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished from
the primary benefit to labor unions ....
NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945).
The 1947 amendments, in extending protection to the right of individual employees
to refrain from concerted activities, would seem to indicate an increased congressional
concern for the rights of the individual employee. Compare NLRA § 7, ch. 452, §
7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), with Labor Management Relations Act § 7, ch. 120, § 7, 61
Stat. 140 (1947). See generally 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 111 (1953).
28. See note 22 supra.
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tiate for better working conditions without fear of discharge. Rather
than adopt the individual/group distinction, it would seem more logical
to analyze section 8(a)(1) cases simply by determining if the relief
sought by the employee would directly benefit his co-workers, regard-
less of whether the employee's conduct was intended to induce collective
action. While adoption of this suggested test arguably would not have
altered the result in the principal case, it would eliminate the difficul-
ties associated with the Third Circuit approach. The court would no
longer be required to draw a fine line between an individual employ-
ee's complaining and conduct designed to induce group action. Those
employees who attempt to cause disruption by persistent complaints on
minor or purely personal issues would not be protected, while those
with legitimate ideas for improving general working conditions would
be free to negotiate without fear of discharge.
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